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Resumo
Como Devemos Estudar as Políticas Externas
dos Pequenos Estados Europeus?
Este artigo examina criticamente o quadro
geral da investigação relativa aos estudos
sobre pequenos Estados. Mais do que apre-
sentar resultados empíricos, enfatiza como é
que as relações internacionais dos pequenos
Estados têm vindo a ser estudadas na litera-
tura académica. Após esta análise crítica,
alarga a discussão pela inclusão da Análise de
Política Externa (APE), a fim de avaliar em
que medida o estudo dos pequenos Estados
pode beneficiar dos debates desenvolvidos no
quadro daquela disciplina. Os problemas in-
ternos da APE são discutidos em virtude da
fragmentação de abordagens. O artigo propõe
um quadro referencial integrado de análise de
todos os tipos de política externa, incluindo a
dos pequenos Estados, concluindo que as po-
líticas externas dos pequenos Estados podem
ser estudadas da mesma maneira que as polí-
ticas externas de outras categorias de Estados.
Esta sistematização implica a criação de um
quadro referencial integrado e inclusivo.
Abstract
This contribution starts off with a very brief
overview and critique of some of the past and
current research contributions to small state
studies. The aim here is to highlight how the
international relations of small states have been
studied, rather than to present substantive
empirical results of such research. After this critical
analysis the discussion will be broadened by looking
at the current status of foreign policy analysis
(FPA) as such, and to ascertain to what extent
small state studies can benefit from debates within
the latter. However, since it is argued that FPA
itself has problems due to its fragmentation into
various largely incompatible approaches, the paper
concludes with a brief presentation of an integrative
framework for the analysis of all types of foreign
policy, including those of small states. My message
is essentially that the foreign policies of small
states should be studies in the same manner as the
foreign policy behaviour of all other types of states,
and that in order for this to be feasible, we need an
integrative framework which works equally well
for both of these purposes.
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Introduction
In one of the few recent overviews of the current condition of research on the
international relations of small states, Olav Knudsen poses the question of where
“do small-state studies find themselves at the present juncture”, and concludes laconically:
“Apparently, not entirely at the forefront of world affairs”.1 Along the same lines the two
editors of an even more recent contribution to this field note that the “study of small
states as a specific research category reached its peak in the mid-1970’s”, and refer to
Peter Baehr’s conclusion (in 1975) “that the concept of small states was not a useful
analytical tool for understanding world politics”.2 Nevertheless, both of these contributions
then go on to argue for why we should not accept these conclusions, since (as Neumann
and Gstöhl argue) small state studies “are still a relatively young discipline occupying a
niche position in IR,” and that this “niche holds considerable potential for future
research, both on individual small states and on theoretical aspects relevant to IR”.3
The task I have taken upon myself is to give these claims a closer look, specifically with
the view of providing some pointers on appropriate approaches to the study of the
foreign and security policies of the small European states.
This discussion will proceed in the following manner. In the next section a very brief
overview of some of the past and current research contributions to small state studies will
be presented and thereafter critically discussed. The aim here is to highlight how the
international relations of small states have been studied, rather than presenting substantive
empirical results of such research. In short, the discussion here will concentrate on
second-order issues of conceptualization and analytic approaches, not on the historical
development of the international relations of small states or on the status of its empirical
analysis today. After this critique of the past and current condition of ‘small state studies’
the discussion will be broadened by looking at the current status of foreign policy
analysis (FPA) as such, and to what extent small state studies can benefit from debates
within it. However, since I argue that FPA itself has problems due to its fragmentation
into various incompatible approaches, I will conclude with a brief the presentation of
an integrative framework for the analysis of all types of foreign policy, including
those of small states, which – I argue – has the potential of enriching both fields of study.
1 Knudsen, 2002: 182.
2 Neumann and Gstöhl, 2006: 11, 12.
3 Neumann and Gstöhl, 2006: 16.
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Small States in the Study of International Relations: The Past and the Present
For all practical purposes the modern analysis of the international relations of
small European states was established by Annette Baker Fox in her landmark book on
The Power of Small States, published in 1959.4 In it she inquired into how the governments
of small states such as Sweden, Spain, Turkey, Switzerland, Ireland and Portugal avoided
being drawn into the Second World War, while other similarly small and weak states
failed to do so. Her answer was simple: through skilful diplomacy and favourable
geostrategic location they were able to convince the great powers that continued
neutrality on the part of the small state was advantageous to these powers.5 Subsequent
studies latched on to this issue of how small states could survive the dominance of the
greater powers and mitigate the effects of structural constraints.6 As noted by Neumann
and Gstöhl, “a whole branch of research focused on the question of which policies
might help prevent or reduce the consequences of smallness and scarcity”.7 Apart
from studies of this kind – pursued almost exclusively by European scholars (usually
themselves from small states) – focusing essentially on various strategies for the survival
of small states, a more ‘scientific’ interest emerged in the wake of the comparative foreign
policy analysis movement in the United States. Here a major hypothesis, posited in
order to facilitate generalisations, was that states of similar size or power tend to
behave in similar ways in their foreign policies, and hence that the decision-making
processes within these would differ from those of more powerful states.8 In contrast
to larger states, it was claimed, small states focused more than large states on joint
actions, working within international forums and giving economic issues priority.
Most of these hypotheses and generalisations were subsequently falsified, and as a
consequence “these approaches to small states were not much further developed in the
1980s and early 1990s.”9 Indeed, as argued by Niels Amstrup, despite the ‘scientific’
ambitions driving comparative foreign policy scholars, there was “an astonishing lack
of accumulation” in small state studies during this period, while another Danish
scholar noted how these studies suffered from “benign neglect” within the larger field
4 Annette Baker Fox, 1959.
5 See Neumann and Gstöhl, 2006: 9-10.
6 Ulf Lindell and Stefan Persson, 1986.
7 Neumann and Gstöhl, 2006: 10.
8 Maurice A. East, 1973.
9 Neumann and Gstöhl, 2006: 12.
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of International Relations (IR).10 However, despite these pessimistic assessments,
described as a ‘standstill’ in small state studies, Neumann and Gstöhl nevertheless
perceive a ‘revival’ on the horizon, propelled by international, economic and technological
developments once again favouring this field of study. “The improvements in
communication and transportation as well as the liberalization of the movement of
goods, services, capital and even persons and public procurement,” they argue,
“rendered borders less meaningful to the benefit of small states”.11 Furthermore,
in addition to these processes of globalisation and regional integration, they also
argue that “small state theory has been promoted and challenged by the unprecedented
emergence of new small states in Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and the
Baltics after the fall of the Berlin wall”.12 They also point to new theoretical developments
within IR favouring small state studies – in particular social constructivism with its
strong focus on international norms, identity and ideas. Hence, they note, if in
addition to relative power (the focus of neorealists) and institutions (as emphasised by
neoliberals) also ideational factors matter, small states may gain new scope in their
foreign policy:
They may, for instance, be able to play the role of norm entrepreneurs influencing
world politics; they may not only engage in bargaining with other (greater) powers,
but also to argue with them, pursuing framing and discursive politics, and socially
construct new, more favourable identities in their relationships.13
It is at this point in their overview that they (as quoted in the beginning) wish
to emphasise the potential of this field for establishing its own niche within IR, which
would benefit not only the study of particular small states but also the theoretical
development of IR itself. But how persuasive is this conclusion and how feasible is the
recommendation?
My own view on this is the following. First of all, as already noted above, a major
reason why small state theory came to a standstill was the assumption that such
states were so different from other actors that they needed to be dealt with as a
distinct class of entities. More specifically, there was often a failure in this literature
10 Niels Amstrup, 1976: 178; Wilhelm Christmas-Möller, 1983: 39.
11 Neumann and Gstöhl, 2006: 13.
12 Neumann and Gstöhl, 2006: 13.
13 Neumann and Gstöhl, 2006: 14-15.
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in distinguishing between first-order substantive empirical issues and second-order
questions pertaining to the classification of phenomena. Hence, it was easy to draw the
facile conclusion that since small states often behaved differently from larger states, they
ipso facto represented a different class of entities and hence required to be treated
analytically in terms of a theoretical domain of their own – ‘small state theory’. But such
a conflation of these two levels of analysis is very questionable indeed, both for conceptual
and empirical reasons.
Conceptually, all states today are defined in terms of the same formal criteria of
statehood, and these have nothing to do with size. Size only enters into the picture when
comparing states empirically – as one possible factor explaining differences or similarities
between the actions of states. Size is thus an empirical not a conceptual attribute.
Furthermore, empirically there is no warranty for the assumption (or hypothesis)
that small states tend to behave in a similar fashion, and large states in a similar
fashion. For example, although the Nordic states are all small, what has characterised
their foreign policy behaviour is not in the first hand similarity but difference – Sweden
and Finland opted for neutrality after World War II, while Norway and Denmark
joined NATO. And even though the first two states ostensibly pursued a similar foreign
policy stance, in actual fact we are here confronted with two fundamentally different
forms of neutrality. The same goes for Austria and Switzerland.14 And although both
Norway and Denmark decided to ally themselves with a military alliance headed by the
United States, they did so in terms of different membership conditions. And although
Denmark has been a long-standing member of the EU, Norway continues to remain
outside the Union.
A second issue which, in my judgement, has undermined small state studies is the
problem of demarcation: how to draw a clear line between smallness and bigness – and
everything in between on such a scale.15 Barry Buzan has recently posited a distinction
between superpowers, great powers and regional powers, which has involved him in
an extensive conceptual discussion and the difficult task of ‘rethinking definitions’.16
In my view, his conceptual problem is significantly easier to solve than the problem
of empirically distinguishing between the far larger number and motley types of micro
states, small states, medium sized states, larger states, and so forth, which populate
14 See my discussion in Carlsnaes, 1998.
15 See, e.g., Baehr, 1975.
16 Buzan, 2004.
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the international system and are members of the United Nations. Indeed, even if we limit
ourselves to European states, this is a task which will inevitably lead to controversy and
perhaps even be viewed as an essentially contestable issue. This problem is further
exacerbated if we define size in terms of capacity in some sense or other, since that would
be to beg an important empirical question in the study of small states: their relative
capacity in pursuing foreign policies of their own choice. It is for these and similar
reasons that Knudsen avers that it “is primarily in the study of small states in the
context of an international confrontation with great powers, or of small states as units
in a context of a particular external problematique (e.g. globalisation) that the small-
-state concept can defend its utility.”17 But once we follow this track we are no longer
in the business of conceptualising or operationalising size; rather, we have taken the
empirical route of placing a given state within a larger substantive context, i.e., viewing
it in relation to other empirical entities deemed to differ substantially in terms of size.
This brings the notion of relativity into the picture: in some relational contexts a given
state may be deemed small compared to other states, while in other contexts they would
not. This is one reason why Buzan has introduced the notion of regional powers to
distinguish them from both superpowers and great powers. Thus while, e.g., South Africa
is viewed as a regional great power, it is arguably not viewed as a great power in the
context of the larger international system.18
The conclusion which I draw from these considerations is that the international
relations of small states should not be analysed as if they belonged to a distinct class of
their own, but rather as that of any other state. In other words, I see no reason why the
same analytical framework should not be used for studying the foreign and security
policies of both large and small states alike, especially in view of the dormant and
problematic nature of small state studies compared to the very active status of foreign
policy analysis (FPA) today. I will therefore now turn to a brief consideration of the
current nature of the latter, and then to the question of how – given the problems inherent
in this sub-field of IR as well – a common framework for the study of the foreign policies
of small and large states alike could possibly look like.
17 Knudsen, 2002: 185.
18 See Buzan, 2004: 63-72.
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Foreign Policy Analysis Today: Any Help Here?
What characterizes the condition of FPA today, and are there any lessons that the
study of the foreign policies of small states can learn from recent debates within it? The
good news here is that that, on the whole, a consensus exists today on the nature of the
explanandum (that which is to be explained), although it has taken a circuitous route for
scholars to reach this point of relative agreement. In my interpretation, this consensus
boils down to a specification of the unit of analysis that emphasizes the purposive nature
of foreign policy actions, a focus on policy undertakings and the crucial role of state-like
boundaries.19
The bad news is that here scholarly agreement within FPA ends. Indeed, as I have
argued elsewhere, beyond a general agreement on what to study and to explain, there
is no consensus how such studies should be conducted, with the result that we are
presented with a number of different approaches in the literature.20 These can be
structured in terms of the following matrix, in which the horizontal dimension pertains
to issues of epistemology in social theory (essentially along the lines of Max Weber’s
celebrated distinction between Erklären and Verstehen), while the vertical dimension
expresses the classical ontological choice between holistic and individualistic approaches
to social science explanations:
Ontology Epistemology
Naturalism Interpretativism
Holism Structural perspective Social-institutional perspective
Individualism Agency-based perspective Interpretative actor perspective
Fig. 1: Four Rock-Bottom Perspectives in Foreign Policy Analysis
In an overview of current FPA we find, first of all, an array of (i) agency-based
approaches to the study of foreign policy actions, focusing either on the role of
individuals and groups in the foreign policy process or on the cognitive and psychological
characteristics of decision-makers. So-called bureaucratic politics and liberal approaches
can also be said to belong to this category. A second major group of current analytical
19 Carlsnaes, 2002.
20 Carlsnaes, 2002.
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frameworks is premised on a (ii) structural rather than agency-based perspective in the
analysis of state behaviour. Various forms – old and new – of realism are to be found
here, as well as neoliberal institutionalism, which in many respects is simply a benign
version of the former. A third category of approaches, which have become increasingly
prominent during the past decade and half, are premised on a (iii) social-institutional
perspective (with social constructivist roots), and here we can distinguish between a
sociologically oriented (‘thin’ constructivism) and a more discursive strand. Finally, there
is also what can be called an (iv) interpretative actor perspective within FPA, a more
traditional mode of analysis essentially based on the reconstruction of the reasoning of
individual or group decision-makers. In summary form, these various approaches can be
listed as follows:
Structural Perspective Social-Institutional Perspective
Realism/Neorealism Social Constructivism
Neo-liberal Institutionialism Discursive Approaches
Organisational Process Approaches
Agency-Based Perspective Interpretative Actor Perspective
Cognitive and Psychological Approaches Intentional Analysis
Bureaucratic Politics Approach
Liberal Approach
Table 1: Four Perspectives and Nine Approaches in Foreign Policy Analysis
What are we as scholars of the foreign policies of small states to do in view of this
rich flora of alternative approaches to FPA? Two options seem to confront us: either to
accept this state of affairs, and to follow whichever route suits our predilections best;
or to opt for some form of synthetic approach which would combine the various
explanatory components contained in the approaches sketched above. The former is the
easier choice, but it comes at some considerable costs, both for the foreign policy analyst
in general and those particularly interested in analysing the foreign policies of smaller
states.
For FPA as such the problem is that by choosing any one of these approaches
means that we must exclude those aspects which it is not capable of addressing. The
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major such drawback here is that it confronts us head-on with the agency-structure
problem, the implications of which are neatly illustrated in the discussion above: scholars
focusing on explaining policies either view actors as the prime cause of policy actions, or
give structures this role. The problem is that it is generally recognised that in real life
actors and structures do not exist in a zero-sum relationship but, rather, that human
agents and social structures are in a fundamental sense dynamically interrelated entities,
and hence we cannot account fully for the one without invoking the other. None of the
approaches discussed above has resolved this problem, since each tends to privilege
either actors or structures in their explanations.
For analysts of the foreign policy of small states this problem is compounded by the
fact that at least some of these approaches, especially those based on a structural
perspective, are biased in favour of the analysis of powerful rather than small states. This
aspect can also be phrased in terms of the dominance within IR and FPA of North
American scholarship, and hence a primary focus on American foreign policy. But even
scholars who are obviously not in the grip of this American intellectual dominance, such
as Barry Buzan, are nevertheless led, as a result of an essentially structuralist perspective,
to focus their attentions not on small state behaviour but on those of the major powers.21
On the other hand, if one instead opts for an agency-based approach, which does not have
such large state bias, the temptation is to downplay structural factors which, one can
assume with regard to small states, are particularly constraining in terms of available
policy choices. In short, we are then back with the agency-structure problem, and an
essentially lop-sided view of the relationship between actors and their structural
environments.22
An Alternative Approach
My own view is that a synthetic framework for analysing foreign policy is therefore
necessary if we are to escape these and other problems. I also believe that such a
framework is analytically feasible, but that it has to be positioned on a level of abstraction
that does not substantively prejudge explanation in favour of any particular type or
combination of empirical factors. Since I have elaborated on it elsewhere, I will here
21 See, e.g., Buzan 2004.
22 On these issues, see Carlsnaes, 2007.
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simply give a skeletal outline of the explanatory logic of such a suggested synthetic
framework of analysis.23
The starting point is the claim that while the meta-theoretical matrix used above is
specifically designed for the purpose of classifying approaches to foreign policy analysis
in terms of their most fundamental ontological and epistemological presuppositions, it is
less suitable for empirical analysis itself as distinguished from meta-theoretical dissection.
At the same time foreign policy action in ‘real life’ is arguably always a combination of
purposive behaviour, cognitive-psychological factors and the various structural phenomena
characterizing societies and their environments; hence explanations of actual foreign
policy actions must be able to give accounts that do not by definition exclude or privilege
any of these types of explanans. Insofar as the matrix used above does have such
exclusionary implications, it simply will not be able to deliver the goods in this respect.
Thus, rather than thinking in terms of a logic of mutual exclusion, I suggest that we
instead conceptualise such a synthetic analytic framework in terms of a tripartite approach
to foreign policy actions (the explanandum) consisting respectively of an intentional, a
dispositional and a structural dimension of explanation (the explanans), as follows:
Foreign Policy Actions
1 ↑
Intentional Dimension
2 ↑
Dispositional Dimension
3 ↑
Structural Dimension
Fig. 2: Explaining Foreign Policy Actions
Although conceptualised as analytically autonomous, these three dimensions should
be viewed as closely linked in the sense that they can be conjoined in a logical,
step-by-step manner to produce increasingly exhaustive (or ‘deeper’) explanations of
foreign policy actions.
23 Carlsnaes, 1992; 1994; 2002.
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The starting point in such an explanation would be to focus on the first link, i.e., the
relation between a given foreign policy action and the intention or goal that it expresses
(arrow 1 in the figure). This is a teleological relationship, giving us the specific reason(s)
for, or goal(s) of, a certain policy undertaking. This is also a necessary first step, given the
intentional nature of the explanandum. An illustrative example of this type of analysis
is Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice’s detailed study of German reunification.24
It offers an insider’s view of the innermost workings of the top political elites of the
U.S., the Soviet Union, West Germany, East Germany, Britain and France in the creation,
following a series of top-level negotiations, of a reunited Germany. Their analysis
examines the reasoning behind the choices made by these elites, and proffers an
explanation of the immense changes that occurred during the year following the collapse
of the Berlin Wall in terms of this reasoning.
However, scholars who are interested also in giving causal in additional to
intentional explanations will want to go further than this. This distinction can also be
described in terms of an ‘in order to’ and a ‘because of’ dimension in explanations,
in which the former refers to actions pursued intentionally (i.e., in order to achieve a
certain aim), while the latter aims to indicate those prior or underlying mechanisms
which ‘caused’ a given actor to have this but not that intention in the first place. Thus
scholars not satisfied with merely tracing descriptively the reasoning behind a certain
action will want to ask why one rather than another intention in the form of a policy
undertaking was being pursued in the first place.
In such an analysis the next step would be to trace the link between the intentional
and the dispositional dimensions, with a view to finding the particular and underlying
psychological-cognitive factors which have disposed a particular actor to have this and
not that preference or intention (arrow 2 in the figure). In the analysis of such dispositions
the primary focus would be on the underlying values (or belief systems) which motivate
actors to pursue certain goals, as well as on the perceptions which make actors see the
world in particular ways (world-views). This is where cognitive and psychological
approaches to the explanation of foreign policy enter into the analytic picture. In the
case of German unification, for example, in-depth leadership analyses of the various
individual statesmen would be relevant in explaining the actor dispositions of the main
protagonists.
24 Zelikow and Rice, 1995.
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This leaves us with the question how structural factors are to be incorporated into
this framework, since they are present in neither of the first two dimensions. In my
view, they do so in terms of a third, ‘deeper’ and very powerful structural dimension,
always underlying and thus affecting the cognitive and psychological dispositions of
individuals (arrow 3 in the figure). These structural factors – domestic and international,
social, cultural, economic or material – do so in many ways, but essentially as a
consequence of being perceived, reacted to and taken into account by actors; and it is in
this sense that structural factors can be said to influence, condition or otherwise affect
human values, preferences, moods and attitudes – i.e., actor dispositions as here
conceptualised. Furthermore, as conceived here, this link between underlying structures
and actors can be conceived as both constraining and enabling, causally affecting
the dispositional characteristics of the agents of policy, which in turn determine the
particular types of intentions motivating policies. In the case of German unification, such
structural factors would be the end of the Cold War, the economic decline of the Soviet
Union, the group dynamics of the persons involved in the negotiations, the continued
consolidation of a peaceful European Community – to name but a few.
Although the example used above pertains to the foreign policy actions of some of the
major powers, the same explanatory logic can be applied to the analysis of actions
pursued by the elites of small states. In other words, this is not only a synthetic,
integrative framework for analysing foreign policy, but one which is neutral to the issue
of size and power. These, and other factors, enter into the equation as possible empirical
factors which help explain any given foreign policy actions rather than as ex ante
components defining the unit of analysis itself. This conceptualisation is essential if the
study of the foreign policies of small states is to move from the condition of the ‘standstill’
which has characterised it for too long, to one of ‘revival’ and indeed maturity as a
full-fledged of field of study worthy of full membership within International Relations.
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